A critical flaw in VMware vCenter Server has been exploited by hackers since early September 2026, and the patch only arrived on 19 November. The bug lets an attacker with network access to vCenter log in as an administrator without any password at all.

What the flaw is

The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-123890 and carries a severity score of 9.8 out of 10. It sits in the VMware Directory Service, the part of vCenter that handles single sign-on logins.

In simple terms, the login handshake leaks a secret session key. An attacker who can reach vCenter over the network can grab that key and turn it into a full administrator session — no username, no password, no warning on the login screen. From there, the attacker controls the console that manages your entire virtual environment: every server, every virtual machine, every snapshot.

Broadcom fixed it on 19 November 2026 in security advisory VMSA-2026-0009, which also patches four other flaws in vCenter, SDDC Manager and VMware Tools for Windows.

Who is affected

Almost every current vCenter deployment. The fixed versions are:

  • vCenter 9.1.x — fixed in 9.1.1.0200

  • vCenter 9.0.x — fixed in 9.0.2.0200

  • vCenter 8.0 — fixed in 8.0 Update 3m

  • VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x — fixed in 5.2.5

  • Telco Cloud Platform and Infrastructure — fixed through vCenter 8.0 U3m

vCenter 7.0 is a special problem. Its general support ended on 2 October 2025, so it gets no standard patch. Broadcom assumes it is vulnerable too; only customers on an extended support contract can request a fix through Broadcom Support. If you are still running 7.0, this is the week to make a decision about it.

One more warning: patching for an earlier vCenter authentication flaw, CVE-2026-59309, does not protect you here. The server Mandiant investigated was already patched against that older bug, and the attackers got in anyway. Every vCenter below the new fixed versions needs this update.

Monitors in a dark server room showing a red attack path spreading across a network
The group came in through a remote-support tool, crossed an unprotected internal appliance, then took over vCenter itself.

How the attack worked

Mandiant and the Google Threat Intelligence Group published their investigation on 20 November. They attribute the attacks to a group they call Armory Castle, previously tracked as UNC5221, a suspected China-nexus espionage actor.

The break-in did not start at vCenter. The group first exploited a separate zero-day, CVE-2026-102764, in BeyondTrust Remote Support, then moved sideways to an internal Linux appliance that had no endpoint protection on it. From there they scanned the network for VMware systems.

Against vCenter they used a custom tool Mandiant calls BONESAW. It copied the vCenter directory database, stole the signing key the server uses to vouch for logins, and created a brand-new single sign-on administrator account. A second tool could forge login tokens with the stolen key. The attackers switched SSH on, took database credentials, and pulled Active Directory files straight out of the virtual disks of guest machines. For persistence they planted backdoors and web shells with names like BEARBONES, LAZYBONES, SLIMSAVAGE and CAGEMATCH.

The pattern is worth noticing: a remote-support tool, an unprotected internal appliance, then the virtualisation console. None of the steps needed a password.

An IT engineer applying a security update on a laptop with a checklist beside him
Patch first, then hunt: check for rogue admin accounts and replace the signing certificate if anything looks wrong.

Patching is step one — not the whole job

Because this flaw was exploited for over two months before the patch, updating alone may not be enough. If attackers already created accounts or stole your signing key, the patch does not remove them. Mandiant's guidance, in plain steps:

  1. Apply the VMSA-2026-0009 update now, outside your normal patch cycle. The update cannot be installed through vCenter Quick Patch — use the standard update process. Running virtual machines keep working while vCenter updates.

  2. Review your single sign-on accounts for any administrator you do not recognise, and remove it.

  3. If you find any sign of compromise, replace the vCenter token service (STS) signing certificate and reset all SSO passwords — otherwise forged login tokens stay valid even after patching. A password manager makes resets like this far easier to handle across a team.

  4. Check the appliance logs for SSH being switched on and off, which the attackers did during the intrusion.

  5. Restrict network access to vCenter — especially port 2012 — to trusted management hosts only, and put endpoint protection on internal Linux appliances, not just on Windows servers.

This is also where the lesson from this month's outage stories cuts the other way: patch fast, but verify after. A rushed patch that nobody checks can leave a rogue admin account sitting quietly behind it.

Why this one matters more than most

vCenter is not an ordinary application. It is the control panel for the whole virtual data centre, which makes it one of the highest-value targets in any company network — and attackers know it. A flaw that hands over administrator access without a password, exploited quietly for two months by an espionage group, is about as serious as infrastructure bugs get.

If your organisation runs VMware, treat this as today's job: patch, then hunt. The window where this was a secret is over — the details are now public, and every attacker who reads them knows exactly which servers to look for.

Sources: Broadcom security advisory VMSA-2026-0009 (19 November 2026); Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group investigation (20 November 2026); BleepingComputer; The Hacker News; Rapid7; Censys.